Peter Emmerson

2.3.2 Fluctuations in the balance of influence, uncertainty and authoritarianism: idealism is still alive and well in 20^th century.

Even though there has been a formal discussion of the ideal of uncertainty for quite some time is has made little headway. Thus, even where authoritarian figurations are more constrained and quiet, and a diversity of discourses develops, the growth in influence of uncertainty, never mind relative uncertainty, has been slow. There is a direct analogy here with Darwin’s ideas on species formation. In extreme climates only very specialised, limited varieties of life forms can flourish. Where absolute rulers are in place, authoritarian governance is more likely and any form of resistance is more easily driven out. Uncertainty as a mode of perception may be anathema to absolute rulers, who thrive by their very nature as guardians of the absolute truth, exterminating if necessary those who resist or threaten the position of the figuration which they lead. Where the tools of social repression such as violence, available to governing figurations have to be controlled, models of uncertainty are more likely to flourish and prevail as they have done since the 17^th century in western Europe and related cultures.

However, the conditions for less authoritarian styles of governance are contingent and therefore reversible. The voices of highly influential absolutist figurations are only muted by such developments until the balance of social influence moves back in their favour, when the truth-finders can be re-engaged to provide the ideological underpinning for a renewed bout of authoritarianism: the example of British governance since 1979 is a case in point. The democratising changes in the balance of social influence in favour of organized labour that contributed to the Labour landslide election victory and the formation of the welfare state after WW2, were accompanied by a growth in the level of uncertainty that for many became too much to bear; even those it had favoured. Thus, the Thatcher government was elected to reinstate order, a euphemism for certainty, with the tacit agreement of a large number of people in the UK who were culturally opposed to its market economic ethos. Of course, relative uncertainty has not gone away; it is just less visible curtained by conviction politics, backed by what Althusser termed the ‘repressive state apparatus’, and luck: it is arguable that the successful campaign to re-take the Falklands saved the Thatcher government, even though so many people perished in the process. Governing figurations can reassert authority by making idealistic promises that the future is in their control. Nonetheless, such promises are found wanting as the complexity of relatively uncertain variables such as those pertaining to human social networks defeat their over-blown statements: the credit crunch is the most notable recent example; the latest of a long list.

  2.3.1 Case Study: the law as an important instance of the emergence of relative uncertainty.

As democratising processes have emerged and extended, gradually displacing authoritarian practices associated with absolute rule, there has been a concomitant growth in opportunity for personal autonomy, often called individualism, as more and more people recognise the tactical benefits of self-control as a useful technique for living with business-oriented figurations. Elias shows how the interrelated decline in the level of violence is correlated with the formation of nation states where the more centralized governance involved is reliant on increasing levels of taxation, which in turn gives more and more influence and responsibility to those figurations employed in the burgeoning bureaucratic processes. However, legal functions are well worth a specific mention.

The proliferation of the influence of lawyers is impressive. The specification of guilt and punishment is clearly very important in the less authoritarian process of management by consent, albeit backed by the potential for violent suppression where required. The law, unlike many bureaucratic processes, has to be seen to work otherwise people will not accept its legitimacy. To achieve this it operates on what is basically a scientific programme of research, where the factual evidence is given priority, thereby pushing the influence of the theologians further to the margins, in favour of a heavier dependence on the more secular truths of metaphysicians. The problem is that the models developed by the logicians, in particular the mathematicians, have only limited application to issues of guilt or innocence. Therefore, the business-oriented figurations and their lawyers are heavily reliant on the philosophers for their truths. The problem is that the ideals produced by the philosophers will be of only limited value because their models relate to the human mind and have no real jurisdiction over the facts. Thus, the truth foundations of the legal processes are shaky because, as with science, they are mostly dependent on factual evidence which is uncertain.

Such a contingent experience is correlated with the conditions in which legal figurations operate, where higher levels of social interdependency prevail and where the authority of the law is best employed with consent. That consent is only guaranteed by factual evidence which because it is unpredictable, broadcasts to the world the existence of uncertainty! Hence, in life threatening judgements, established figurations place juries at the hub of their legal processes because they recognise the level of doubt in every decision: the use of juries has a long history in dispute resolution in Britain, possibly for this reason. As legal processes are so closely attached to the facts, and thus distanced from the truths that allow authoritarianism, it should not be surprising to find that in lawyers we have some of most self-controlled, relatively detached, scientific professionals in the business-oriented world, who achieve their aims through negotiation. Ultimately the legal network is about making decisions on life and death. In the past hanging judges such as Jeffries were unimpeachable, feeling no need to doubt their right to make decisions. Now judges act interdependently by managing the process of judgement involving figurations of people who provide the evidence for a ballot of relatively detached jurors – Why? – because there is uncertainty, knowledge that extends as far back as the beginning of the 13^th century when Magna Carta was agreed. Such decisions are made in relation to a continuum between at one end ‘certainty’, with ‘uncertainty’ at the other. It is here where one of the most significant indicators of civilising and democratising processes is evident; it is here where the nature of uncertainty is very salient and where we feel most uncomfortable; it is here where the heat of the fight is most controlled, where excitement is turned down in favour of sobriety, where the relative detachment of a lawyer who is defending the indefensible is clearly visible. Why? – because it is common knowledge that everything is uncertain.

In connection with this, I recently heard Lord Justice Bingham say that the law is based on certain absolutes, hence my use of ‘certainty’ and ‘uncertainty’ in the above rather than my preferred relative uncertainty. From my perspective I would suggest he is wrong – the law is founded on a belief in absolutes, a conviction that ideals can be useful as the means to define innocence or guilt. The facts of the matter are otherwise, for I believe that there is no absolute method of deciding these issues in social networks where the balance of influence is less favourable to established figurations, because their potential to exercise their authority by imposing their truths is constrained. As a result, in more democratic, less authoritarian social webs, we judge guilt or otherwise by a show of hands by one’s peers, especially in more serious cases. These are the social networks where certainty has been largely driven out, and where negotiation takes place on the authority of material evidence rather than ideals. The growth in the significance of reality-oriented legal processes has evolved alongside the rise in influence of democratising, business-oriented figurations. There has been a concomitant decline in interest in the views of ecclesiastical and philosophical absolute truth finders. This is I would argue, suggestive of a negative correlation between the gradual emergence of business-oriented figurations (which includes scientists) and authoritarianism.

2.3 The emergence of formal arguments suggestive of uncertainty.

The processes of change I have tried to detail above occurred interdependently with one another, not as separate unrelated developments. They were part of a network of interrelated gradual transformations that were unplanned, with no necessary outcomes. However, that does not mean that they were unpredictable; they were just relatively unpredictable – a perception too far, in a world so heavily dominated by idealism.

As mentioned earlier natural philosophy was renamed science in the first half of the 19^th century, by which time its practitioners functioned interdependently with the traditional truth-finders, the theometaphysicians, as the suppliers of the more mathematicised ideals reinforcing the authority of the emergent commercial figurations. The growth in influence of the latter, committed to rational democratic systems, market economics and greater personal autonomy, was sufficiently established by the 1700s to allow the possibility of people entering into open, formal discussion of ideas that questioned the very existence of absolute truths. In Britain before this time people who proffered such arguments would have been liable to violent suppression from the agents of monarchical and ecclesiastical rule. During the 18^th century philosophers such as David Hume were publicly attacking the foundations of Christian religious belief, and by the 1800s atheist revolutionaries such as Karl Marx were even questioning the sanctity of philosophical knowledge, whilst residing as a refugee in Britain. The possibilities of uncertainty were openly debated.

Such examples of the greater tolerance of arguments from uncertainty may well be linked to the decline in the level of violence meted-out by authorities throughout much of Europe to those who challenged established figurations: thus incarceration has tended to replace capital punishment. Michel Foucault argued that this change was part of the extension of disciplinary technology, imposed on non-bourgeois groups through the military, schooling, hospitals etc., in order to produce a docile work force. I think Elias’ model of the civilising process that plots the gradual extension of the use of self-control, offers the possibility of a more valid explanation of the decreasing level of violence.

Whilst Elias gives focus to the monopolization of the means of violence by established figurations such as monarchies, I want to emphasise the significance of the process of doing business. To do business you become interdependent with a range of people, whether as customers, partners, investors, or employees. Doing business benefits from management rather than physical suppression. Thus, acting without careful consideration of the reactions of others is potentially counterproductive; violence is a last resort. Where Foucault relates the decline in overt violence to a bourgeois strategy to create order, Elias explains it as a correlate to movement in a more complex nexus of social interdependencies. Imposition from those with high influence is but one factor in a social nexus that involves the activities of figurations with less influence such as employees, who are more reliant on negotiation rather than force.

What is clear from Foucault is that the increased use of prisons, as opposed to torture and capital punishment, has accompanied the rise to positions of influence of business-oriented figurations. However, in doing so he gave insufficient weight to the way these commercially oriented networks of people function with a much higher level of social interdependence where the use of violence is, in other than legally prescribed situations, much more unacceptable: to be successful in such networks you must be skilled in exercising self-control. A good example of the importance of interdependence is the threat posed to the dominance of business-orientated groups by striking employees. Nowadays in Britain such acts of resistance will only be met with violence on very rare occasions: the last event of note in this respect was the suppression of the views and actions of militant figurations of miners headed by Arthur Scargill during the 1980s, who decided to confront a new bout of government authoritarianism inspired by a revival of the 18^th and 19^th century market economic idealism. This process of realignment was already moving ahead in the USA with the election of Ronald Reagan who headed groups committed to a strident reaffirmation of American dominance after the defeat in Vietnam. In Britain a similar campaign was waged by figurations which had as their speaker Margaret Thatcher. Whatever the reasons for the emergence of the new-found self confidence backed by a revitalised market economic model associated with the likes of Friedman, it is usually the case that resistance in contemporary Britain has to be managed, not put down violently. I think it is fair to say that these less authoritarian styles of governing are connected to the changes mentioned above that allowed Hume to publish his work.

2.2 The growth in influence of uncertainty: interdependencies between business-oriented figurations including scientists and their partners the pure mathematicians.

These processes of change were interdependent with the emergence of a more liberal, democratic perspective from governing figurations, which found it much more difficult to suppress people who held and gave formal expression to views different from those in authority. This relaxation of authoritarianism was also accompanied by the arrival of the ‘Enlightenment’ writers who helped undermine the influence of tradition, by stressing the significance of a new and improved set of ideals correlated with the attempt to come to terms with profane experience – the laws of nature. These new figurations of truth-finders, who provided the ideological platform for the insurgent business-oriented groups, were influenced by mathematicians like Newton and more secular philosophers such as Bacon, Descartes and Locke. Turgot, Adam Smith and David Hume, furthered this type of approach speaking in terms of concepts such as ‘market’ and ‘reason’ in direct opposition to government by ecclesiastical or royal whim. It was not that the new liberal, realistic perspective to running things rejected the use of idealism as a means of controlling potential resistance, it was more that the enlightened model of idealism allowed greater room for diversity and personal autonomy; something quite unexpected and difficult to control. According to Smith there was less need for governing figurations to employ direct methods of constraint because this would occur naturally, guided by the universal rules of the market. These new truths that would assist the business-oriented figurations achieve their aims, were derived from a different amalgam of elements: less mysticism, more metaphysics (verbal and numerical logic) and increasing amounts of natural philosophy (science); a mix that produced social sciences such as economics. It is I believe reasonable to suggest that an unplanned by-product of the enlightenment belief in the efficacy of the laws of nature was the further exploration of uncertainty. The greater tolerance and more democratic style of the new elite of business figurations, was based in the fervent belief that control would be provided by the forces of nature if they were allowed to function: the application of the new market economics was an important example. This new metaphysics is another form of absolute truth, another form of ideal; this time more secular or natural, scaffolded on the rock of mathematics. The latter is not the direct word of God and does not have the same status as the Ten Commandments, but it has something approaching that, the authority of absolute truth expressive of the divine presence. Such a truth, albeit man-made, was extremely valuable to business-oriented figurations who needed clear justification for their ambitions and the means of control once their aims were achieved.

By the 19^th century, natural philosophers, now called scientists, were well established as partners of the governing figurations in Britain. Their status was interdependent with the success of the models developed by the likes of Newton that produced a less religious view of the universe using upgraded tools of idealism such as the new mathematics. Earlier however, in the 17^th century natural philosophy was a supplement rather than a rival to the old verities of theometaphysics; just an additional method of finding the absolute truth that facilitated the opening up of the new frontier with sensory experience. Nonetheless, it is fair to say that the growing acceptance of natural philosophical ideas reinforced previous changes that occurred during the reign of Henry VIII in lowering even further the volume of the voices of those espousing religious truths to the ears of the governing figurations. Even though Newton was a mystic and a believer in the absolute truth of the laws that God put in place to run the universe, the scientific style of thinking which he and others developed, with its requirement for the factual validation of models, made the discussion of uncertainty more likely: it is not a great cognitive leap to disconnect God from the laws of nature and mathematics, as Darwin and Einstein later showed. Where the certainty of God comes into question so can the certainty of everything, even mathematics and logic.

The new mathematics and the related trust in reason were more than adequate replacements for the decline in influence of religious truth-finders. It is as if people need a bank of truth on which they can rest easy: the currency (religious, philosophical or mathematical) deposited changes with movements in the balance of social influence between competing figurations, but the need for some form of absolute truth of whichever currency has been consistent. As business-oriented figurations flourished, so the truth vaults were emptied of religious currency and replenished with the more secular funds reliant on mathematics and applied reason. The problem for the fund managers replenishing the vaults with the more secular knowledge resources required by business-oriented figuration, is that the new truth-finding process, being less reliant on the absolute dogmatism of religion, is less valuable than the old stock because it is more unstable, being reality-based rather than mind-based. As a result it always falls short of the gold standard required to define absolute truth; science, even backed by the reliable shadow of pure mathematics, is defined by uncertainty. The new more secular knowledge compound contains an element of instability that the ancients such as Plato warned about. By introducing base metal such as human sensory experience into the knowledge coinage, albeit stabilised with a good quantity of gold in the form of the new metaphysics, the currency is always relatively unstable. In other words there is no possibility of absolute control.

 2. The Socio-psychogenesis of the Ideal of Uncertainty: changes in patterns of social influence exploring the interdependencies between the rise of business-oriented figurations, a more material type of idealism, and a decline in authoritarian governance.

2.1 The rise and fall in influence of monarchic figurations: some processes in the decline of the theological truth-finders.

There are good reasons for believing that nothing in mundane human experience is certain, even though very influential constructors of ideals, namely, theometaphysicians, have for millennia, certainly in Europe, furnished us with absolute truths and in the process distracted us from thinking otherwise. One very important reason for the manufacture of such knowledge is to supply elite groups with the authority necessary to govern; a point I learned from Zygmunt Bauman. The holders of social influence use absolute truths to counter resistance in the form of alternative argument, especially in more democratic countries. If such a tactic is unsuccessful, then the means of violence can be deployed, justified on the grounds that those in opposition were given a fair chance to come to their senses.

Under the figuration headed by Henry VIII, no such caution was felt necessary. The English monarchy at this time felt so confident in its capacity to govern that it was willing to relax its hold on the truth by throwing out the authority provided by the Roman Catholic Church, in order to replace it with a more convenient Protestant message. The ensuing conflict was accompanied by doctrinal ferment, which, as far as I can see, contributed to opening the way for a more secular system of absolute truths: the balance of social influence was moving even more in favour of the monarchical figuration and away from the priests, and for the rest, it may well have been a matter of ‘we don’t care because it has nothing to do with us’. Consequently, most of the English agents of God in their retreat, took on more of a support function rather than directly competing with monarchical interests. For example, the unhelpful and threatening religious dissident Thomas More, was given time to adjust his perception of the truth, before being dispatched to oblivion by the more influential monarchic figuration which by then had much less need to worry about possible condemnation from the Church.

Just over a hundred years later we see a more reasoned justification of the subservience of the Church in Thomas Hobbes’ Leviathan. Hobbes’ book is a very good example of the way influential figurations use verbal logic (philosophy) to justify their activities. As the level of influence of monarchic figurations in Britain increased there came a point, the Reformation, at which they could bring one of their greatest rivals, the Church, to heal. Part of the reinforcement of this change in the patterning of authority was to lower the volume of ecclesiastical truth statements in favour of more secular, metaphysical forms of truth-finding from philosophers such as Hobbes, and mathematicians. Interdependently, this offered more scope for arguments from relative uncertainty. For a justification of this way of discussing social influence see the Introduction to The Court Society by Norbert Elias.

My argument is that God’s truth-finders played a less directorial role in patterning daily life after the Reformation. This is not to deny that their influence was still substantial: the significance of puritan ethics in relation to the activities of revolutionaries such as Oliver Cromwell is well documented, let alone their connection to the development of capitalism as explored by Max Weber. However, I believe that these were part of democratising changes interdependent with the decline in religious control and the concomitant growth of forms of secular authority, initially monarchic then business-oriented. What is interesting is that by the 17^th century, even the more secular truths used to justify the right to rule such as the personal superiority of the monarchical figurations were under threat, as Oliver Cromwell’s promotion to Lord Protector testifies. True, the monarchical groups re-established their dominance after Cromwell died, but his emergence as a non-royal leader was a shot across the bows for monarchies, an indication that social processes were in motion that would permanently threaten their ancient hold on influence.

I often think experts on political revolutions take too little account of the emancipatory impetus that resulted in the British revolution, by giving precedence to the events of 1789 in France over a hundred years later. One might argue that the potential for a republic in Britain was too raw in the 17^th century, even though the democratising forces were strong enough to play their part in the execution of a monarch. I suppose the British experience is seen as a revolution that failed, in contrast to France. However, whilst the British monarchy was restored in a watered down form, it did not crush the republican impulse, which can be seen to re-emerge in America and then France where many of those who were sympathetic to the revolution ended up: were the events just over a hundred years later in 1775 and 1789 a matter of unfinished business? My point is this; that from the 17^th century onward there was a continuation of the gradual contraction of ecclesiastical influence, given further impetus by the decline in authority of monarchical figurations. These changes were interdependent with the growth in influence of groups with commercial interests partnered by truth-finders of an even more secular leaning.

 1.5 The Problem of Power

Whilst making the case for using Elias’ approach with respect to my analysis of the way we use idealism in the search for certainty, I also want to question our use of the concept ‘power’. To me power is a variable more akin to physics and engineering than sociology: it tells us for example, about the ability of motors to do work. Human bodies do work and thus the notion of power could translate to an understanding of the activity of the body through bio-engineering: powerful bodies can do work very quickly. However, in the context of the latter, power is not that good a fit, as the complexity and dynamism of biological forms is not directly analogous to a motor. There is even less fit between power and human social webs. Instead of power I want to use the less mechanistic notion of ‘social influence‘ which I am familiar with in the context of social psychological models that analyse compliance, conformity and obedience. By replacing power with the notion of social influence I think we get a closer appreciation of the complexity and dynamism of processes such as domination, a better description of the pervasive and turbulent interdependencies of forces that are involved in human experience. Power suggests more capacity to make things happen than in fact we have. Social influence is more sensitive to an understanding of both human impotence and resistance.

Will resume postings on January 1st with the next exciting instalment.

 1.4 The Development of Social Science, its Bond with Theometaphysics and the Resistance to a Focus on Dynamics and Process

The complex changes of which the civilizing process is a component, feature the rise to power of business-oriented, democratizing groups who were more interested in exploring reality, if only to make money. The Renaissance indicated certain trends in the experience of influential groups: a growth in self-reliance and a decline in fatalism, a rise in humanism and a decrease in religiosity: see John Carroll’s Humanism. Rather than simply accepting God’s prescription and the agents who purveyed it, many more people saw the rewards involved in managing the world as something that could be understood. The natural philosophers (scientists) were part of this change, chaperoned by the exponents of idealism in the form of numerical logic, the pure mathematicians. Even so, this was an important step away from idealism per se, in that it involved a more rigorous dialogue with the relative uncertainty that is reality. The balance of influence had moved slightly away from the guild of theometaphysicians, involving a significant change in emphasis as the theologists and philosophers were distanced from influence in favour of the mathematical idealists. The process was accelerated as applied scientists such as engineers, medics, economists and sociologists emerged bringing people closer to a reality-oriented approach.

The arrival of sociologists in the 19^th century such as Auguste Comte indicates the growth in influence of historical perspectives on what can be known, which were important in the development of scientific models that move us further down the continuum towards greater reality-orientation. In sociology this took the form of a variety of models, the most prominent being those associated with Marx, Durkheim, Weber and Parsons. Nevertheless, from my perspective they all suffer from one major fault: they were all too heavily involved with theometaphysics. It is not until the model developed by Norbert Elias that we see a type of analysis that employs a sufficient level of detachment from the idealism of theometaphysics to allow sociologists the opportunity to become more autonomous and more scientific: the same may well be the case for economists, psychologists and anthropologists. As far as I can see the main force of Elias’ argument is that sociologists need to become process-oriented in order to engage more closely with the dynamism of their subject matter. This is difficult because of the influence of the theometaphysical discourses that still pattern our thinking and activity, with their emphasis on stability. However, if we take Elias’ lead we can make sociological tools more dynamic and fit for purpose; otherwise sociology will remain ostensibly a branch of theometaphysics, or at best, as Popper observes – history. With this in mind Elias takes us some way down the road in developing more scientific sociological concepts that emphasise fluidity such as ‘figuration’, ‘relative detachment’, the ‘established and the outsiders’. There is an emphasis on the verb rather than the noun; there is no attempt to establish absolutes or causes; there is a focus on answering questions, on the problem not the solution. Sadly, too few have caught on so far.

  1.3 Idealism and Control

I find the argument from Elias that the emergence of formal science is related to long-term social changes convincing. To re-cap, his model of the civilizing process traces the gradual emergence of more and more people with greater levels of self-control, that eventually becomes so habituated it appears instinctive or natural. This self-control evidences itself to the person involved, as a split in their self-perception or identity, which provides us with the facility to talk to ourselves: such cerebral activity is not a sign of madness so much as evidence of the civilizing process. As a type of psychological make-up this is not new: the great theometaphysicians of ancient times clearly had this facility; both the highly influential models of Plato and Aristotle contemplate a world where the absolute truth exists, but at a distance from our factual existence.

Elias focuses his analysis of the continued development of such a psychological type by correlating changes in language use associated with self-control that occurred during the middle ages in what we now call France, in particular, the arrival of the concepts ‘courtoisie’ and ‘civilité’. What is interesting is not the existence of self-control but the manner in which its use has expanded and deepened since that time: hence the civilizing process. The growth in self-control is, argues Elias, a feature of the development of scientific ways of being. However, from my perspective, this change in the patterning of social experience has taken place in close partnership with the dominant theometaphysical mode of analysis, which prioritized discourses which speak of truths and ideals. As a result it should not be surprising to find scientists espousing logic and mathematics and imposing such models on the relative uncertainty of the external reality they were investigating. For such people there are two worlds; one of truth lodged in the mind, the other of error located in factual experience to be made sensible by transposing it into something stable and reliable, using the truth-finding techniques of verbal and numerical logic (pure mathematics). It is not that long in European terms that we have been able to openly question such a model without the threat of severe sanctions.

The world of truth offers the possibility of singularity, a state of mind where absolute detachment from reality is possible and where stability, certainty or uncertainty can be established – a place inhabited by what Elias termed Homo clausus (closed, isolated man). The drawback is that such a perception is at odds with our daily factual experience where change abounds, making the position adopted by Homo clausus untenable because as Darwin pointed out: that which doesn’t change becomes extinct. So why cling to such a way of thinking that leads only to the end of the species? The answer I believe is that idealism has survival benefits even though it exists as a complete contradiction. Its contradictory status belies a deeper need for control.

  1.2 Contemporary Forms of Idealism: theometaphysics

As I was driving down the A1 in December 2009 I listened to an episode of the BBC Radio 4 programme The Moral Maze which sparked the thoughts that produced this essay. The programme employs a number of prominent commentators to discuss contemporary ethical issues. The participants on this occasion were a mixture of people with expertise in science, philosophy, theology and politics including ex-cabinet minister Michael Portillo and eminent stem-cell researcher Lewis Wolpert. Part of the discussion analysed the possibility of being morally neutral as regards science and was I assume (I didn’t hear the start of the programme) linked to the furore that developed in relation to the alleged manipulation of data by climate scientists at the University of East Anglia. What intrigued me was that Professor Wolpert seemed to believe that his values did not interfere with his science. In the same programme Mr Portillo gave the impression that being political could separated from being moral. I find such beliefs in these well informed and highly influential people very surprising, as it is questionable whether they fit with the facts. This essay is an exploration of the continued popularity of these views and why we should view them with suspicion.

My argument is that such perspectives are related to the uncritical use of ideals. Idealism has an ancient heritage which I believe is correlated with people’s need for control and security in a world that is threatening and difficult to predict. A belief in the existence of absolute truth regularly accompanies methods of dealing with the world quite probably related to its capacity to bolster feelings of certainty and safety. I am reminded of a 1995 tv programme presented by the biologist Richard Dawkins in which he expresses incredulity in reaction to the views of believers in ‘creationism’ from Alabama, USA. What he didn’t speak about was that such idealism is not limited to the views of ordinary Americans, but is present in the views of professional scientists who are also prone to make-believe; it is just that their fantasies are usually more mathematical than biblical. Idealism is everywhere, entangled in our culture and too often heavily disguised as science.

From my position there are three ways of looking at the world that provide ideals: religious or theological; philosophical or verbal logical, what used to be called metaphysical; mathematical or numerical logical, often partnered by scientific, which when all rolled up together form the basis of absolute truth in our knowledge. These methods of identifying the truth of things attract apostles who investigate their potential in the search for the definitive meaning of life. The importance of these three techniques of truthfulness varies in relation to the problems people are confronted with; nowadays we tend to tackle problems scientifically thus mathematics is pre-eminent. These true forms of knowledge all have one thing in common: they are idealistic. Let’s take the scientific idolization of mathematics as an example.

Mathematics is an approximation to the facts; it is a tool to aid the measurement of weight, height etc. The problem is that if studied with little reference to the facts, on what is called the ‘pure’ level, it can produce systems of analysis that have the entrancing possibility of providing truths or proofs; it can be used to calculate certainties. However, these certainties don’t actually exist: Pythagoras’ triangle is an example: it is a triangle that exists only in the human mind where perfection is possible – an example of a Platonic form. Real triangles, made by engineers, cannot emulate such feats of precision. Engineers deal in approximations not proofs. Proofs are dreamed up in the minds of people I call truth-finders, they are ideals.

Such ideals in themselves are not a problem, they are just games. They do however have dangerous side effects because they lead to very beguiling outcomes: they offer the prospect of certainty. Certainty is very appealing on the personal level; it can offer us solace in a life full of pain and danger. In addition, it has utility in the competition for survival. Privileged groups recognise the benefits of truths as tools for continued domination and employ experts in the search for ideal forms of knowledge such as theologians, philosophers and mathematicians, the truth finders, to justify their right to govern. Certainty, as Plato pointed out, offers stability. Stability is extremely attractive to elites in the battle to retain their position at the top: I have a God-given right to rule; I earn millions in bonuses because the market has judged me the best. Those in charge have an interest in reinforcing their authority by getting truth-finders to transpose their views into certainties, which by definition cannot be questioned and in time come to be seen as given, natural, logical. Ideals can be used as tools for domination; they are what might be called knowledge technology.

My essay is an exploration of ideas that dispute the belief in the possibility of being exact, other than in the truth-finding territories of religion, formal philosophical and mathematical logic. The notion of objectivity as knowledge that is rational or correct is examined. In relation to my argument that nothing outside of religion, philosophy and mathematics is stable or truthful, then it is only in these areas of analysis that objectivity really exists. However, as we know, it’s use is not restricted to idealism as a tool for truth-finding: many scientists or lawyers for example would claim objectivity in their method and judgements. In this sense to be objective is not to be tainted by human values, the opposite of subjective. I want to suggest that this is an ideal state of existence impossible to achieve by real people, developed by truth-finders to support their view that stability in the form of absolute truths exists beyond the religious, philosophical and mathematical horizons. Consequently, I would dispute the possibility of anyone being objective about sensory experiences and that we can somehow ever dissociate ourselves from our values, even when acting as a scientific truth-finder like Lewis Wolpert; the noisy influence of prejudices can be turned down or up, but never silenced. The latter, objectivity, is an occurrence that happens only in religious, philosophical or mathematical utopias. Relatedly, being moral is being political is being scientific, because, as with other perspectives available to us, they are interconnected. However, such a view of the patterning of knowledge is not very palatable because it is disturbing for people’s peace of mind and has the potential of de-stabilizing the networks of social influence used by elite figurations!

I have tried to plot a pathway through the webs of social influence that have patterned certain aspects of European history using a model taken from Auguste Comte and Norbert Elias. However, I want to condense Comte’s approach by amalgamating two of the his three fields of human knowledge: theology and metaphysics. The latter is in turn modified to include both forms of pure logic; verbal and number (philosophy and pure mathematics). As far as I can see they are just different species of a common genus – idealism. Hence, I want to use the term theometaphysics to represent the confluence of ideals of a supernatural or formal logical status. This rejects the argument that the attempts at transforming theometaphysics from Descartes onwards were anything truly radical, suggesting that these were just re-branding exercises in response to the onslaught from secularizing forces such as business-oriented figurations and their allies, which demanded a greater emphasis on mathematics.

This re-branding of metaphysicians is I suspect partly an attempt protect vulnerable forms of truth and its acolytes (theologians and verbal logicians) from the rise in influence of more material forms of knowledge such as science and its ideal partner, mathematics. Nevertheless, philosophers are part of a discipline that owes its raison d’etre to idealism – if they move too far along the continuum towards realism, they turn into scientists. Philosophers owe their status to their forebears as successful truth-finders, whose style of analysis dominated formal discourses on knowledge in the past, and still heavily influences our discussions today: the discussion on The Moral Maze being just the tip of the iceberg. My belief is that since the 17^th century and probably as far back as the Renaissance, their status has been under threat from what were then called natural philosophers or what we now know as scientists, who because of their involvement with the factual world, have a tendency to being anti-idealist.