Peter Emmerson

1.1 Grounding

 I want to begin this essay by referring to the influence of sociologist Norbert Elias. As far as I can see his work on the nature of human knowledge is at the limit of what we can rely on: thus, I start from there. His books, The Civilizing Process vols I & II, The Court Society, Involvement and Detachment, The Symbol Theory and What is Sociology? provide most of the material from which I have developed these ideas. I want to argue that they offer a basis on which sociologists, and for that matter scientists generally, could extend their understanding and improve their ability to help sort out social or natural problems. Elias built on the findings of his predecessors, something no doubt true of many writers. However, Elias did not just reform their ideas, whether philosophers, historians, natural scientists or social scientists, he radically reworked them to produce an alternative more viable analysis of what science is and what a social science could and should look like. In this respect his work is like no-one else’s since it has survived and prospered where his main rivals in Marxism (with its emphasis on class conflict) and Parsonianism (which gives precedence to the importance of value consensus), were found profoundly wanting. Unfortunately the continuing interest in Elias’ work has been accompanied by a cataclysmic crisis in sociological confidence where scientific modes of analysis are concerned, that may explain the continued under-exposure of the model, since the dethroning of Parsons and Marx.

It is my view that there has been a de-sciencizing process going on in sociology that needs to be resisted, especially as close scientific relatives, biology and psychology, have been visibly prospering underpinned by the Darwinian model. It is my belief that the flood gates were opened for the anti-science figurations of sociologists correlated with the theoretical vacuum that opened up as the two giants collapsed during the late 1960s and early 70s, allowing sociology to be re-colonized by a band of truth-finders whose interests were about linking sociology to the humanities, by strengthening the bond with its parent, philosophy. From what I can see this was a serious mistake as sociologists are seen as offering just another learned opinion rather than providing scientifically backed models for testing.

This begs the question – what would a new scientific sociology look like? This is where Elias comes in. I’m not suggesting that, as yet, his model offers a social scientific equivalent to Einstein, Heisenberg, Dalton or Darwin: a giant of the contemporary sociological universe, Tony Giddens, has commented on the small likelihood such an outcome. However, he may be wrong. At least Elias’ model takes a sociological approach rather than falling back on the parent philosophy for answers to its problems: Elias offers a scientific way out.

My essay is a modest contribution to this process by focussing on the problem of idealism. There are three interrelated aspects of interest here. Firstly, idealism makes scientists susceptible to utopian flights of fancy such as the pursuit of the absolute truth/error. Secondly, that the practices of science become distorted by the pursuance of idealistic notions such as equality and justice. Thirdly, that an excess of such ideals creates an environment where scientists are very susceptible to over-stating the value of their findings. My argument is that we can use Elias as an anchoring point to keep sociological voyages of discovery tied to realistic destinations and practices, where all is relatively uncertain.